SO\u3csub\u3e2\u3c/sub\u3e Policy and Input Substitution Under Spatial Monopoly by Gerking, Shelby & Hamilton, Stephen F.
SO2 policy and input substitution under spatial monopoly
Shelby Gerking a, Stephen F. Hamilton b,*
aUniversity of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816, United States
bCalifornia Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407, United States
Following the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, electric
utilities dramatically increased their utilization of low-sulfur coal
from the Powder River Basin (PRB). Recent studies indicate that
railroads hauling PRB coal exercise a substantial degree of market
power and that relative price changes in the mining and
transportation sectors were contributing factors to the observed
pattern of input substitution. This paper asks the related question:
To what extent does more stringent SO2 policy stimulate input
substitution from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal when railroads
hauling low-sulfur coal exercise spatial monopoly power? The
question underpins the effectiveness of incentive-based environ-
mental policies given the essential role of market performance in
input, output, and abatementmarkets in determining the social cost
of regulation. Our analysis indicates that environmental regulation
leads to negligible input substitution effects when clean and dirty
inputs are highly substitutable and the clean input market is
mediated by a spatial monopolist.
1. Introduction
Cap and trade systems for pollution control are much heralded, and rightly so, for their ability to
marshalmarket forces to achieve pollution reductions at the lowest possible cost. An important aspect
governing the performance of market-based approaches to environmental problems is the ability of
pollution markets to align private incentives in the afﬁliated output, input and abatement markets
that intersect with the policy. There is general consensus that the landmark success of the U.S. Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, which achieved U.S. air quality objectives at a fraction of the anticipated
cost (U.S. Department of Energy, 2000), was driven largely by input substitution among U.S. electric
utilities from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal (see, e.g., Carlson et al., 2000). The substantial degree
of input substitution that occurred between these coal deposits contributed to low SO2 allowance
prices, thereby defraying costly social adjustments that would otherwise have taken place in
electricity and pollution abatement markets. Over the period 1990–2002, coal production from high-
sulfur deposits in the Illinois Basin (Illinois, Indiana, and West Kentucky) declined by 42%, while low-
sulfur coal production from the Powder River Basin (PRB) of Wyoming and Montana doubled and the
number of utilities burning PRB coal more than tripled. This paper examines the potential role of the
cap and trade system for SO2 emission allowances in driving the observed pattern of input substitution
in U.S. coal markets.
In principle, the creation of a pollution allowance market should stimulate a coordinated set of
changes in themarkets intersectingwith environmental policy. To support a socially optimal resource
allocation, allowance prices must be derived from an optimal set of adjustments in output markets
(electricity), abatement markets (e.g., ‘‘scrubbers’’), and input markets (high-sulfur coal, low-sulfur
coal, natural gas, oil) that serve to equalize the marginal returns across activities. Because empirical
studies of energy markets generally ﬁnd household electricity demand to be highly price inelastic
(Reiss and White, 2005), the ability to achieve environmental objectives with minimal disruption in
consumer markets is facilitated by elastic supply conditions in abatement and input markets. For
example, if coal deposits with different sulfur content are perfectly substitutable in electricity
production and available at equal factor prices, SO2 reductions could be met largely through input
substitution, without the need for substantial investments in abatement equipment or output
adjustments. In the event that the supply of low-sulfur coal was perfectly elastic, environmental
objectives could be obtained at zero cost.
The main point of this paper is that spatial market power over low-sulfur coal deliveries to electric
plants forecloses input substitution possibilities that would otherwise occur in response to SO2
regulation. While it is evident that the effectiveness of environmental policy depends on the presence
of market power in the markets for alternative inputs, our analysis highlights the pernicious effects of
inputmarket imperfectionwhen deliveries aremediated by a spatialmonopolist. Indeed, in the case of
perfectly substitutable coals and perfectly elastic supply by mines, we show SO2 policy to be
completely ineffective in stimulating input substitution between high- and low-sulfur coals. The
direct implication of this ﬁnding is that private incentives introduced by amarket-based policy for SO2
emissions appear to be largely conﬁned to electricity markets, abatement markets, and input markets
for alternative fuels besides low-sulfur coal. The indirect implication of this ﬁnding is thatmuch of the
apparent success of the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments in achieving environmental objectives at
lower-than-anticipated cost was due to input substitution from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal
among electric utilities that had little, if anything, to do with environmental policy. Instead, it appears
that the timing of SO2 policy was simply serendipitous. As Ellerman and Montero (1998) observe, the
U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 coincided with a period of substantial declines in the real
prices ofminemouth PRB coal and rail transportation. These features, unlike SO2 policy, are capable of
stimulating the observed, substantial increase in aggregate deliveries of low-sulfur coal by a railroad
monopoly market.
We frame our observations around amodel of spatialmonopoly power in themarket for low-sulfur
coal. The potential for railroads to exercisemarket power in the low-sulfur coalmarket is an important
consideration, because virtually all low-sulfur coal in the U.S. is hauled eastward fromWyoming by a
handful of railroads serving PRB mines.1 Among railroads serving these lines, two ﬁrms – Burlington
Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) andUnion Paciﬁc (UP) – currently initiate all transportation of PRB coal.2 The
potential for railroads to exercise spatial market power has been recognized since at least the case of
Standard Oil (see Granitz and Klein, 1996), and evidence exists that railroads hauling PRB coal out of
1 Alternative modes of coal transportation out of the PRB either are not cost-effective (e.g., trucking) or else do not exist (e.g.,
barges and coal slurry pipelines).
2 The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, which entered the Wyoming coal transportation market in the early 1980s, no
longer serves the PRB. Also, the BNSF and UP do not always complete deliveries to all power plants because coal is frequently
transshipped via other lines.
Wyoming indeed exercise a considerable degree of market power (Wolak and Kolstad, 1988; Busse
and Keohane, 2007).
A large literature has emerged to examine the potential for imperfections in permit markets to
erode the gains of market-based environmental policies (see, e.g., Hahn, 1984; Joskow et al., 1998;
Montero, 1999, 2002). In light of this fact, it is somewhat surprising to note that little attention has
been focused on market performance in the markets for abatement equipment and alternative inputs
that intersect with cap-and-trade policies. Our analysis bridges this gap by examining the essential
role of transportation markets for alternative inputs in mediating the performance of market-based
environmental policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a simple model
of spatial intermediation by a monopoly railroad in the low-sulfur coal market. In Section 3, we
calculate the effect of SO2 policy on the aggregate quantity of PRB coal delivered to electric utilities in
the special case of perfectly substitutable coals. In Section 4, we conclude with some brief comments
on the case of differentiated coal deposits and outline directions for further research.
2. The model
We consider a dominant ﬁrm-competitive fringemarket structure in which utilities either buy low-
sulfur coal from amonopoly railroad or purchase high-sulfur coal from a competitive industry. To focus
the model on the implications of SO2 policy for the low-sulfur coal market, we limit the fuel portfolio
available toutilities to twopotential fuel inputs – low-sulfur coal andhigh-sulfur coal – and suppress the
possibility of electric plantsmeeting the regulation throughother compliance options. Implicitly,we are
assuming that coal-ﬁredutilities cannot burnnatural gas or oil, and that switching fromhigh-sulfur coal
to low-sulfur coal is more cost-effective than avoiding fuel-switching altogether by installing post-
combustion abatement equipment (‘‘scrubbers’’).3 Although slight differences exist in practice in the
energy and sulfur content of each type of coal, depending on the particular mine fromwhich the coal is
sourced, we simplify the analysis by treating deposits of each type of coal as uniform in composition.
In the Midwestern U.S., high-sulfur coal is generally procured from deposits in reasonably close
proximity to individual utilities. Relative to the market for low-sulfur coal, freight rates make up a
smaller percentage of delivered prices for high-sulfur coal, resulting in delivered prices that do not
vary substantially across locations in practice. To focus the model on the low-sulfur coal market, we
assume that high-sulfur coal is ubiquitously available at a constant delivered price of ph. Monopoly
prices for low-sulfur coal, in contrast, vary over space according to proximity of the utility demanding
low-sulfur coal to the source mine.
2.1. Utility demand for PRB coal
Demand facing railroads for deliveries of low-sulfur coal is derived from the proﬁt-maximization
problem of electric utilities who seek to produce energy from alternative fuel inputs. To clarify our
observations on the effect of a spatially intermediated inputmarket, we assume the electricity market
is competitive and utilities are homogeneous in all respects apart from their location in space.4
Utilities are arrayed spatially along the rail line and face different freight rates, and hence different
delivered prices, for PRB coal.
The problem facing a utility at distance x is to select a quantity of PRB coal, ql(x), and a quantity of
high-sulfur coal, qh(x), to maximize proﬁt subject to environmental policy on SO2 emissions. Let s
denotes the SO2 emissions coefﬁcient for high-sulfur coal, so that SO2 emissions for a utility at distance
3 As Carlson et al. (2000) observe, inputsubstitutionatU.S. electricutilities fromhigh-sulfurcoal to low-sulfurcoalhasproven to
be substantially more cost-effective as a method of emissions control than the use of post-combustion abatement technology.
4 The implications of the model regarding incentives for fuel substitution among cost-minimizing electric utilities are
qualitatively similar to those which would arise in a regulated monopoly electricity market. Under regulated monopoly, the
ability of utilities to pass-through cost changes into electricity rates does alter the output effect of SO2 regulation in electricity
markets. Extending the analysis to the electricity sector, which would complicate the model by adding an independently
regulated consumer pricing structure, would provide a greater apparatus to sift through without fundamentally altering
incentives for fuel substitution among utilities seeking to minimize fuel cost.
x can be deﬁned as e(x)=sqh(x). Under cap-and-trade policy, each utility is given an initial endowment
of SO2 allowances (possibly zero) and must purchase an SO2 allowance for each unit of emissions
above this level at the permit price, denoted l.
The market price of an SO2 allowance is taken as given by each ﬁrm, but is determined
endogenously by the size of the regulatory cap on emissions in the market. We represent the spatial
market for coal inputs by arraying all electric utilities on a unit line segment and denote total SO2R R1 1
emissions as E ¼ 0 eðxÞdx ¼ s 0 qhðxÞdx. The sum of all SO2 allowances held by utilities must meet
the regulated level of E under the emissions cap, which we denote by E0.
Let pe denote the electricity price and pl(x) denote the delivered price of PRB coal at distance x. A
utility with an initial endowment of e0 allowances maximizes proﬁts of
puðxÞ ¼  p f ðqlðxÞ; qhðxÞÞ � plðxÞqlðxÞ �  phqhðxÞ þ lðe0 � eðxÞÞ;e
subject to non-negativity constraints on the use of low-sulfur coal, qlðxÞ�0, and high-sulfur coal,
qhðxÞ�0, and the link between high-sulfur coal use and SO2 emissions, e(x)=sqh(x). An electric utility
that is a net seller of emission allowances satisﬁes e0 � eðxÞ>0, and a utility that is a net purchaser of
emission allowances satisﬁes e0 � eðxÞ<0.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a maximum are
G l� p f lð:Þ �  plðxÞ � 0; G lqlðxÞ ¼ 0; (1)e
G h� p f hð:Þ �  ph � sl � 0; G hqhðxÞ ¼ 0; (2)e
where f lð:Þ and f hð:Þ denote the marginal product of each type of coal in electricity production. Let
ps=ph+sl denote the ‘‘effective price’’ of high-sulfur fuel, which is the gross price of an input of high-
sulfur coal inclusive of its implicit SO2 allowance requirement. Notice that the effective price of high-
sulfur coal is independent of both distance and the initial allocation of SO2 allowances; hence the input
mix at each utility between low-sulfur coal and high-sulfur coal depends only on the relative prices,
pl(x) and ps.
At an interior solution, the input mix for each utility equates its marginal rate of technical
substitution with the ratio of prices, pl(x)/ps. In the event that delivered prices for low-sulfur coal rise
over distance from the PRB, utilities along the rail line faced with a constant effective price of high-
sulfur coal smoothly substitute away from low-sulfur coal and towards high-sulfur coal over space to
an extent that depends on the elasticity of substitution between these fuels.
Depending on the value of the elasticity of substitution, a corner solution is also possible. Prevailing
evidence suggests that low- and high-sulfur coal are highly substitutable inputs at electric plants
(Gerking and Hamilton, 2008), implying a large elasticity of substitution. In the case of perfect
substitutes, normalizing units for the energy (BTU) content of each type of coal, we can deﬁne
f lð:Þ ¼  f hð:Þ ¼  f 0ð:Þ and adjust units accordingly. By inspection of expressions (1) and (2), the
conditional (inverse) demand for low-sulfur coal in the case of perfectly substitutable fuels is given by
pðqlðxÞÞ for pðqlðxÞÞ � p and zero otherwise.s
Let Dlð p ; plðxÞ; p Þ andDhðp ; plðxÞ; p Þ denote the demand functions for low- and high-sulfur coal
that solve conditions (1) and (2) for the utility at location x. The demand for each type of coal at the
electric plant depends on the electricity price, the delivered price of PRB coal and the effective price of
high-sulfur coal.
e s e s
2.2. The rail sector
Our model extends the framework of Greenhut and Ohta (1972) to consider spatial market power
by a monopoly railroad over an endogenously determined service region. The railroad purchases low-
sulfur coal at a constant price of w per unit from competitive mines located at the origin of a rail line
and delivers it at a marginal cost of t per unit of distance (x) to identical electric utilities, which are
assumed for analytic convenience to be uniformly distributed along a rail line of unit length.5 The total
Based on proprietary railroad data in themarket for PRB coal, Gerking andHamilton (2007) conclude that the cost of hauling
one ton of coal one unit of distance is constant in the service region for PRB coal.
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cost of delivering coal to a utility at distance x is txDlð pe; plðxÞ; psÞ, and the total cost of procuring andR N
Dldelivering an aggregate quantity Q ¼ ðp xÞ; p Þdx of PRB coal in the market accordingly is0 e; plð sZ N
cðQÞ ¼  ðwþ txÞDlð p ; plðxÞ; p Þdx;e s
0
whereN�1 is the extensivemargin of service. Fixed costs, which are necessary to justify the existence
of railroad market power, play no role in the analysis and are consequently omitted.
The railroad’s problem is to select the number of utilities to serve, N*, and a delivered price plðxÞ for
each utility in the service region x2 ½0;N��. The railroad’s proﬁt is
Z N
pðw; t; p Þ ¼  ð plðxÞ � tx�wÞDlðp ; plðxÞ; p Þdx: (3)s e s
0
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a proﬁt maximum are completely characterized by the
Euler equation,
Dlð pe; plðxÞ; psÞ þ ð plðxÞ � tx�wÞDllð pe; plðxÞ; psÞ ¼ 0; forx2 ½0;n�; (4)
a boundary condition on interior pricing,
Dlð pe; plðxÞ; psÞ ¼ qsð psÞ; for x2 ½n;N�; (5)
and the transversality condition
ðplðNÞ � tN �wÞDlð pe; plðNÞ; psÞ ¼ 0; (6)
where 0< qsð p Þ is a ﬁxed quantity delivered to locations n�x�N.s
Conditions (4)–(6) have straightforward interpretations. Condition (4) deﬁnes the optimal
monopoly price for delivery of PRB coal to a utility located at distance x. It states that the optimal
monopoly price at distance x be set so that the percent mark-up of delivered price over marginal cost,
txþw, is equal to the reciprocal of the demand elasticity. Delivered prices are higher for more distant
utilities than for utilities in closer proximity to the source of PRB coal because the marginal cost of
delivery rises in x, whereas price-cost margins narrow for more distant utilities as demand becomes
more elastic at higher delivered prices. As delivered prices rise over space, utility demand for PRB coal
decreases until one of two things happens: (i) a minimum shipment size is hit that satisﬁes Eq. (5); or
(ii) demand falls smoothly to zero until the freight rate, plðNÞ �w, equates with unit transportation
cost, tN, at the distance deﬁned by Eq. (6). Eq. (6) deﬁnes the location of the critical utility, x=N, beyond
which shipments to more distant utilities no longer contribute positively to railroad proﬁt. Because a
monopoly railroad can spatially price discriminate, railroad service continues until the delivered price
is driven to marginal cost and proﬁt falls to zero on the extensive margin of service.
There are two reasons why a minimum shipment size may bind on deliveries over space in Eq. (5).
First, aminimum shipment quantitymay emerge due to integer constraints, for instancewhen it is not
practical to deliver a fraction of a rail car of coal.6 Second, the non-negativity constraint in utility
demand Eq. (2) may bind, in which case a monopoly railroad might maintain delivery prices at the
corner as deliveries continue over space. For example, when low- and high-sulfur coal are perfect
substitutes, the delivered price for low-sulfur coal rises over distance to ps and then remains constant
at that level until proﬁts fall to zero on the extensive margin of service (see below). In either case,
freight prices set by a monopoly railroad would rise over space in an interior pricing region over
distances 0<x<n, and then remain constant at a level necessary to maintain demand over the
remaining distances in the service region, n�x�N. Hereafter, we refer to the region of unconstrained
monopoly pricing as ‘‘region I’’ and the region of constrained monopoly pricing as ‘‘region II’’.
Consider the case of monopoly freight rates, f ðxÞ ¼  plðxÞ �w, in the case of perfectly substitutable
fuels. As in a conventional dominant ﬁrm-competitive fringe model with perfectly elastic supply,
demand for low-sulfur coal becomes horizontal at the effective price of high-sulfur coal, ps, generating
Gerking and Hamilton (2008) classify shipments of less than 50 rail cars of PRB coal as intermittent shipments used for ‘‘test
burns’’, which suggests deliveries do not smoothly fall to zero along the rail line in practice.
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a discontinuity in the marginal revenue schedule for low-sulfur coal. Equilibrium freight rates in
region I are determined by the intersection of marginal revenue and marginal transportation cost for
PRB coal. Freight rates rise smoothly over distance in this region until the delivered price of PRB coal
rises to ps. At this point, the marginal revenue function facing the railroad is discontinuous; the
railroad can continue serving utilities at further distances, but only at a delivered price at or below ps.
Demand and marginal revenue are horizontal at price ps in region II, because utilities have perfectly
elastic demand for low-sulfur coal at this price. The ability to spatially price discriminate ensures that
the railroad continues serving utilities in region II: At distance x=n, a freight rate of plðnÞ ¼  p more
than compensates the railroad for the marginal cost of transporting it, plðnÞ � tn�w>0, so that
continuing service to utilities at distances beyond x=n contributes positively to proﬁt. Service
continues to region II utilities until transportation costs rise at location x=N to meet the terminal
condition (6).
The second-order necessary conditions for a maximum are the Legendre condition,
s
2Dlð p ; plðxÞ; p Þ þ ðplðxÞ � tx�wÞDl ð p ; plðxÞ; p Þ � 0; (7)l e s ll e s
and the endpoint condition (see Caputo and Wilen, 1995),
F� � tDlðp ; p ðNÞ; p Þ � 0: (8)e l s
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we assume these conditions are strictly met.
Let p ðx; t;w; p ; p Þ;n�ðt;w; p ; p Þ, and N�ðt;w; p ; p Þ denote the solution to (4)–(6). With
exogenous ps, the comparative statics for the delivery schedule for region I and region II utilities can
then be derived from (4) and (5). Consider, ﬁrst, the delivered price schedule over distance in region I.
Dropping arguments for notational convenience, use of the implicit function theorem on (4) yields
l e s e s e s
@p tDll l¼ >0; (9)
@x 2Dl þ ðp � tx�wÞDll l ll
where the inequality holds by condition (7). As the marginal cost of delivering a unit of coal increases
over distance, the delivered price of PRB coal rises.
The outcome for the spatial pricing is as follows. The optimal freight schedule,
f � �ðx; t;w; p ; p Þ ¼  pl ðx; t;w; p ; psÞ �w; (10)e s e
rises gradually over distance by (9) until the region I boundary condition is met in Eq. (5), at which
point deliveries continue at constant prices until a distance is reached where the freight rate equates
with unit transportation cost, f �ðN�ðt;w; p ; p Þ; t;w; p ; p Þ ¼ tN�ðt;w; p ; p Þ, on the extensivee s e s e s
margin of service. At this point, deliveries cease.
Fig. 1 compares the freight schedule under monopoly price discrimination to that which would
emerge in a competitive transportation sector. Under competition, the freight rate, ðxÞ ¼ tx risesf c
Fig. 1. Freight schedule over distance under monopoly and competition.
� 
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smoothly from zero at a rate of t over distance until a price is reached where the delivered price meets
the terminal condition (6). Undermonopoly pricing, the freight rate is piecewise concave, beginning at
a higher level, and subsequently risingmore slowly over distance. By Eq. (6), the terminal distance, N*,
must coincide in each case.
How do changes in SO2 policy alter the aggregate utilization of PRB coal when input substitution is
mediated by a monopoly railroad sector? The effect of a binding regulatory cap on SO2 emissions is to
raise the effective price of high-sulfur coal, which in turn causes utilities to change the cost-
minimizing input mix in Eqs. (1) and (2) and to decrease electricity supply. Much of the effectiveness
of environmental policy in achieving environmental objectiveswithminimal consumer harmdepends
on the ability of utilities to substitute away from high-sulfur coal and towards cleaner-burning inputs
of low-sulfur coal to mitigate the decrease in energy supply as allowance prices rise in response to the
policy.
We denote the aggregate quantity of PRB coal delivered by
Z �n
Q� ¼ Dlðp ; p ðxÞ; p Þdxþ ðN� � n�Þqsðp Þ: (11)l e l s s
0
Differentiating Eq. (11) with respect to the allowance price and making the substitution
Dl �ð p ; p ðnÞ; p Þ ¼ qsð p Þ from Eq. (5) yields,e l s s
�Z � � n@Ql� Dl � @N� �Þ @qsðpsÞ ¼ s ð p ; p ðxÞ; p Þdxþ qsð p Þ þ ðN� � n ; (12)s e l s s@l 0 @ ps @ ps
In general, the ability of SO2 policy to stimulate input substitution among utilities towards low-
sulfur coal depends on three effects in Eq. (12). On the intensive margin of service, the rise in the
effective price of high-sulfur coal increases input demand for low-sulfur coal among region I utilities,
which changes the aggregate quantity of PRB coal delivered to region I utilities byR �n
Dl �s ðp ; p ðxÞ; p Þdx units. On the extensive margin of railroad service, the rise in the effective0 s e l s
price of high-sulfur coal leads to two additional effects. First, there is a market expansion effect, which
represents the outward shift in the extensivemargin of service tomore distant utilities. The expansion
effect is given by sqsð p Þ@N� =@ p in (12). Because the extensive margin of railroad service iss s
independent of market structure (see Eq. (6)), the expansion effect is identical under monopoly and
competitive freight pricing. Second, under monopoly, there is a contraction effect,
sðN� � n�Þ@qsð p Þ=@p , which represents a decrease in the equilibrium quantity of PRB coal delivered
to region II utilities. The contraction effect arises when the minimum shipment size in Eq. (5)
decreases in response to an increase in the equilibrium price of low-sulfur coal charged to region II
utilities.
The relative magnitude of the expansion and contraction effects depends on the manner in which
theminimum shipment constraint enters Eq. (5). If theminimum shipment quantity is independent of
the delivered price of low-sulfur coal, for instance if the minimum shipment quantity is 50 rail cars
irrespective of the delivered price, then there is no contraction effect. Alternatively, as we show below
in the case of perfectly substitutable inputs, if the minimum shipment quantity is selected to prevent
utilities from switching to high-sulfur coal in the PRB service territory, then the contraction effect
operates against the expansion effect to limit aggregate deliveries of low-sulfur coal to region II
utilities.
Making use of the implicit function theorem on Eq. (4), the effect of a marginal change in the price
of SO2 allowances on delivered prices of low-sulfur coal in region I is
s s
@p ðxÞ @ p ðxÞ �sðDl þ ð p ðxÞ � tx�wÞDl Þl l s l ls¼ s ¼ ; (13)
@l @ ps 2Dl þ ð p ðxÞ � tx�wÞDll l ll
which takes the sign of Dl þ ðplðxÞ � tx�wÞDl by (7). Eq. (13) states that the delivered price of PRBs ls
coal to each utility in region I rises in response to a marginal increase in the SO2 allowance price
provided that the outward shift in PRB demand (Dl >0) is not coupled with a sufﬁciently strongs
� � � � � � 
� 
� 
� � � 
� � 
rotation effect that makes PRB demand more price elastic. Making use of (13), the effect of an
allowance price increase on the quantity sold to each utility in region I is
@Dlð pe; p� l ðxÞ; psÞ Dl þ Dl @p
� 
l ðxÞ s DllDls þ ð p� l ðxÞ � tx�wÞðDlsDlll � DllDllsÞ ¼ s ¼ :s l@l @ps 2Dl þ ðp ðxÞ � tx�wÞDll l ll
In general, this equation can take either sign; however, in the case of linear demand and imperfect
substitutes, the delivered quantity increases for each utility in region I.
To derive the effect of a change in SO2 policy on the extensive margin served by the railroads,
substitute p ðx; t;w; p ; p Þ and N�ðt;w; p ; p Þ into Eq. (6) to getl e s e s
p ðN�ð:Þ; t;w; p ; p Þ � tN�ð:Þ �w Dð p ; p�ðN�ð:Þ; t;w; p ; p Þ; p Þ�0l e s e e s s
Implicitly differentiating this equation and making use of (4) gives
@N� sð p ðN�Þ � tN� �wÞDl ð p ; p ðN�Þ; p Þl s e l s¼ >0:�ðN�@l tDð p ; p Þ; p Þe sl
An increase in the price of SO2 allowances serves to expand the railroad’s service region.
The foregoing analysis isolates the input substitution effect of SO2 regulation in the spatially
intermediated market for low-sulfur coal by suppressing abatement market and electricity market
effects. In response to SO2 policy, the equilibrium increase in the effective price of high-sulfur coal
integrates each of these responses. Following a rise in the input price of high-sulfur coal, utilities
burning this fuel respond by supplying a lower quantity of electricity and engaging in greater
abatement activities. Consumer electricity prices rise in response, which in turn would stimulate the
use of low-sulfur coal in Eq. (1) in addition to the direct input substitution motivation resulting from
changes in relative input prices.7
In the next section, we characterize the input substitution effect of SO2 regulation in the case of
perfectly substitutable fuels. This is an important case, because the elasticity of substitution between
high- and low-sulfur coal is likely to be quite high. The reason is that generating units at most U.S.
power plants are engineered to burn different deposits of coal more or less intensively as relative fuel
prices change. Coals obtained from different mines are commonly mixed with each other in an
increasingly diversiﬁed fuel portfolio, and blending of low- and high-sulfur coals has occurred atmany
power plants since the early 1990s.8
3. Perfect substitutes
To examine the role of spatial market intermediation on the performance of the low-sulfur coal
market, consider the case in which low-sulfur coal and high-sulfur coal are perfect substitutes.
Normalizing units to align the BTU content of each type of coal, we consider differences between coal
deposits as arising only from differences in sulfur content, so that f lð:Þ ¼  f hð:Þ ¼  f 0ð:Þ in expressions
(1) and (2).
For the case of perfectly substitutable fuels, it is analytically convenient to recast the proﬁt-
maximization problem of amonopoly railroad as a quantity choice problem. From expressions (1) and
(2), the conditional (inverse) demand for low-sulfur coal facing the railroad is given by pðqlðxÞÞ for
pðqlðxÞÞ � p and zero otherwise. Railroad proﬁt, accordingly, iss Z Zn N
pðw; t; p Þ ¼  ð pðqlðxÞÞ � tx�wÞqlðxÞdxþ ð p � tx�wÞqsdx;s s
0 n
where qs solves pðqsÞ ¼  p in utility demand.s
7 The magnitude of the energy price effect would differ according to whether the price adjustment in electricity markets
occurred through a decrease in electricity supply (as modeled here) or according to pass-through relationships in a regulated
monopoly electricity market.
8 Roughly 25% of coal-ﬁred generating units burn a blend of PRB and eastern coal and blending generally does not occur at
utilities in close proximity to PRB mines (Gerking and Hamilton, 2008).
� 
� � � 
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The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a proﬁt maximum are
pðqlðxÞÞ þ qlðxÞp0ðqlðxÞÞ � tx�w ¼ 0; forx2 ½0;n�; (40)
the region I boundary condition,
pðqlðxÞÞ ¼ pðqsÞ ¼  ps; forx2 ½n;N�; (50)
and the transversality condition,
ðps � tN �wÞqs ¼ 0: (60)
Expressions (40)–(60) are analogous to expressions (4)–(6). The delivery schedule is set to equate
marginal revenue with marginal cost for region I utilities in (40). Delivered prices rise smoothly over
this initial portion of the service region until some distance, n*, is reached where pðqlðn�ÞÞ ¼ p in (50),
whereupon prices remain at this level – preempting utilities from switching into high-sulfur coal –
until a distance is reached on the extensive margin of service where proﬁt is driven to zero. At the
extensive margin in (60), railroad deliveries of PRB coal cease, and utilities at further distances on the
line segment burn high-sulfur coal.
In equilibrium, the optimal freight schedule has two distinct spatial regions. In region I, utilities
purchase a sufﬁciently large quantity of PRB coal that interior monopoly prices obtain, pðqlðxÞÞ � p .
s
s
At distance n*, the unconstrained monopoly price rises to ps; however, proﬁt is still positive at this
utility because of the discontinuity in the marginal revenue schedule.9 Because spatial price
discrimination is possible, themonopoly railroad continues to servemore distant region II utilities, but
does so under the binding constraint that pðqsÞ ¼  p . Region II deliveries continue to the distance N*,s
where ps equates with marginal transportation cost, tN
� þw, and proﬁt is fully dissipated in (60).
Next consider the effect of a change in the price of SO2 allowances on railroad shipments of low-
sulfur coal. The aggregate quantity of PRB coal delivered by the railroad is
Z �n
Q� ¼ q ðxÞdxþ ðN� � n�Þqsð p Þ: (110)l l s
0
Differentiating Eq. (110) with respect to the allowance price (l) and factoring terms yields,
�Z � � n �@Q� @q @N� @qsð p Þl l � �Þ s¼ s ðxÞdxþ q ðnÞ þ ðN� � n ; (120)
@l @ p l @p @ p0 s s s
which is analogous to Eq. (12).
Notice that the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Eq. (120) vanishes in the case of perfect
substitutes, because demand for low-sulfur coal by utilities in the unconstrained monopoly pricing
region is independent of ps. Nonetheless, an increase in the effective price of high-sulfur coal creates an
expansion effect in the PRB coal market, which is the second term in the square brackets of (120). The
expansion effect can be derived by substituting N�ðt;w; p Þ into Eq. (60) to gets
p � tN�ðt;w; p Þ �w ¼ 0. Implicitly differentiating this equation yields @N� =@p ¼ 1=t, so that thes s s
expansion effect is given by
@N� � � sql ðnÞ sq ðnÞ ¼ : (14)l @ p ts
The expansion effect of SO2 policy in (14) represents the sales of low-sulfur coal to utilities entering
the extensivemargin of railroad service in response to SO2 policy. An increase in the allowance price of
dl units raises the price of high-sulfur coal by sdl units, which stimulates an expansion on the
extensive margin of railroad service of (s/t)dl units of distance, raising the total quantity of PRB coal
deliveries by sq ðnÞ=t dl units. The expansion effect of SO2 policy is identical under competition andl
monopoly freight pricing, because the terminal condition (60) is identical in each case and q ðn�Þ ¼l
� sq ðN�Þ ¼ q in equilibrium.l
9 s * sFormally, pðqsÞ � tn� �w ¼ �q p0ðqsÞ>0 at x=n by Eq. (40), which implies ðpðqsÞ � tn� �wÞq >0.
� 
� � � � 
� � 
� � 
The contraction effect can be found by substituting qs ¼ q ðn�Þ into boundary condition (50) to getl
pðqsÞ ¼  p . Dropping arguments for notational convenience and implicitly differentiating thiss
sequation gives @q =@p ¼ 1=p0, which yields a contraction effect ofs
@qsð p Þ sðN� � n�ÞssðN� � n�Þ ¼ : (15)
@ p p0 s
An increase in the allowance price of dl units raises the price of high-sulfur coal by sdl units, which
bids up delivered prices for low-sulfur coal along the utility demand curve, reducing the quantity
delivered to each of the N*�n* region II utilities served by the railroad by ðs= p0ðqsÞÞdl units. This
contraction effect results in a decrease in the total quantity of PRB coal deliveries of
ðsðN� � n�Þ= p0ðqsÞÞdl units in the railroads service region.
Summing terms in (14) and (15) gives
@Q� q ðnÞ N� � nl¼ s þ : (16)
@l t p0 
Next, substitute N* from (60) into Eq. (15) to get
�t@Q� ql�ðnÞ p0 þ p �w� ns¼ s ¼ 0;
@l t p0 
where the latter equality holds by inspection of (40). When spatial markets for low-sulfur coal are
mediated by amonopoly railroad sector, environmental policies that raise the price of SO2 allowances
are incapable of stimulating aggregate input substitution from high-sulfur coal to perfectly
substitutable, low-sulfur coal. To better understand this outcome, consider the case of linear demand
among electric utilities for coal, which is depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows the delivered quantity schedule over distance in the service region for low-sulfur coal,
x2 ½0;N��, and the remaining locations of utilities burning high-sulfur coal x2 ðN�;1�. Prior to
environmental regulation, thedeliveredquantity schedule declines overdistance at rate�t/2p0 in region
sI (see Eq. (40)), and then remains constant thereafter at q in region II. Region I extends outward from the0
source mines to the distance n and the length N� � n accordingly deﬁnes the extent of region II. The0 0 0
total delivered quantity of PRB coal is the area under the quantity schedule q0(x
*). The total quantity of
high-sulfur coal burned by electric utilities sums the quantity of coal demanded by utilities located at
sdistances 1�N*. Becauseeachplant outside the PRB service territoryburnsq units of coal at price ps, the0
stotal quantity ofhigh-sulfur coal usedbyall plants is ð1� N�Þq ,which is represented in theﬁgureby the0 0
sarea N0
�bc1. Prior to SO2 regulation, total emissions are E� 0 Þq0.¼ sð1� N0� 
Fig. 2. Total quantity of PRB coal delivered under monopoly freight pricing.
� 
� 
� 
After cap-and-trade regulation, total SO2 emissions decreases to some regulated level, E
� 
1 < E
� . The0
decrease in industry SO2 emissions occurs through a combination of input price effects that reduce the
s suse of high-sulfur coal by utilities, q1 < q , and fuel substitution effects from high-sulfur coal to PRB0
coal among utilities on the extensive margin of service, N1
� >N� . For an arbitrary emissions cap of E� 0 1
units, the total amount of high-sulfur coal used in the regulated industry is represented in Fig. 2 by the
sshaded region, area N�gh1. In equilibrium, total emissions satisfy E� ¼ sð1� N�Þq . Utilities located at1 1 1 1
distances betweenN� andN� complywith the regulation by substituting away fromhigh-sulfur coal to0 1
PRB coal and selling their SO2 allowances to utilities located at greater distances from the sourcemines
for PRB coal. The outward expansion of the service region for PRB coal drives up the delivered price of
PRB coal, and the expansion of the PRB service territory continues to distance N� where the zero proﬁt1
condition on the extensivemargin of the railroad service region clears individual input demand for the
sremaining 1� N� utilities at the quantity (q ).101 1
Notice that the permit price that emerges in the SO2 allowance market is independent of market
structure in the PRB transportation sector. The reason is that the permit price is driven by fuel-
switching behavior at the extensive margin of railroad service (region II) and utility demand for PRB
coal is perfectly elastic for these utilities. The quantity of high-sulfur coal purchased by each utility
slocated in the region 1� N� must clear the individual input demand at a level (q ) that exactly1 1
allocates aggregate SO2 emissions to meet the cap, and the effective price of high-sulfur coal, ps, must
rise to clear demand at this quantity.
After cap-and-trade regulation on SO2, the delivered quantity schedule for PRB coal is depicted in the
ﬁgurebyq1(x
*). Thechange in the totaldeliveredquantityofPRBcoal in response toSO2 regulationcanbe
seen in Fig. 2 as the sum of the expansion effect, area N� fgN� , and the contraction effect, area abfe.0 1
To seewhy these areasmust be equal in the case of perfectly substitutable coals, consider the linear
(inverse) demand function p(x)=a�bq(x). In this case, the delivered quantity to a utility at distance
x=0 is q(0)=a/2b by Eq. (40). The delivery quantity declines over distance at rate �t/2b in region I, and
then remains constant thereafter at qs in region II. Because the total service region expands by 1/t, the
smagnitude of the expansion effect is q1=t.
The contraction effect can be decomposed as the area of the rectangle abfd less the triangle ade. The
� s sarea of the rectangle is given by ðN� � n Þðq � q Þ. The slope of the quantity schedule is�t/2b, so that0 0 0 1
� � s sthe quantity decrease along rail line of length n � n ¼ 2=t is given by (q � q )=1/b. The length of the1 0 0 1
region II service area, N� � n , can then be recovered in the linear case from Eqs. (40)–(60). Evaluating0 0
(40) at n gives a� 2bqs ¼ tn� . Making use of (50), this implies p � bqs ¼ tn� . From (60), p ¼ tN� , and0 0 0 s 0 0 s 0
combining these equations and canceling terms gives N� � n ¼ bq0s=t. The area of rectangle abfd is0 0
s � �thus q0=t. Now consider the triangle ade. Noting that the base of the triangle is n � n ¼ 2=t, its area is1 0
s s s s s sðq � q Þ=t. The magnitude of the contraction effect, therefore, is q0=t � ðq � q Þ=t ¼ q1=t, an amount0 1 0 1
that exactly offsets the expansion effect in the market.
Our analysis predicts no direct input substitution from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal arises in
response to SO2 regulation in the case of perfectly substitutable fuels and spatial monopoly pricing.
Nevertheless, output effects in energy markets that lead to increased electricity prices would provide
incentives for increased use of low-sulfur coal (and impact SO2 allowance prices). With downward-
sloping electricity demand, SO2 policy reduces the total amount of coal combusted by electric utilities,
which increases electricity prices and shifts the derived demand for coal outward at each utility. This
effect would exist apart from the input substitution incentive we have isolated here. In Fig. 2, the rise
in electricity prices would create a level effect in coal input demand, and the magnitude of the level
seffect at the margin (i.e., at quantity level q1) would be capitalized into SO2 allowance prices.
4. Evidence from PRB coal markets
Our analysis predicts that SO2 policy has little effect on the observed input substitution pattern
from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal when the transportation market is mediated by a spatial
10 Formally, under an emissions cap of E� units the extensivemargin of PRB servicemust satisfyN1 ¼ 1� E�=sq1, which can be1 1
s s
1 1 1 1used together with Eqs. (5
0) and (60) to recover q and N� ¼ 1� E�=sq . For a binding emissions cap, the equilibrium allowance
price solves Eq. (60): l� ¼ ðtN� þw� phÞ=s.1
monopolist. Two empirical questions emerge from this observation. First, what does the available
evidence suggest about spatial market power in the low-sulfur coal market? And, second, if the
observed input substitution from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal was not driven by SO2 policy, then
what features of the PRB coal market were responsible for the shift?
There is considerable evidence that railroads hauling PRB exercise market power. In an earlier
paper (Gerking andHamilton, 2008)we examine data from the CarloadWaybill Sample obtained from
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Surface Transportation Board, for evidence of railroad market
power in PRB deliveries. Along 353 observed transportation routes for PRB coal, all deliveries over the
period 1988–1999 were initiated by one of two railroads (BNSF and UP), with market shares of 55.3%
for BNSF and 44.7% for UP in 1999.11 Supplementing these datawith information taken from Form 423
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), we link the quantity of coal received by a power
plant on each shipment to the delivered price and the source mine for the PRB coal, resulting in
comprehensive transactional information on the spatial pricing of PRB coal over 1229 observations
(mine-utility pairs).We examine Lerner indices, controlling for route-speciﬁc effects, and ﬁnd that the
average values of the Lerner indices fall with distance in the sample, a ﬁnding that concurs with the
spatial pricing proﬁle depicted in Fig. 1.12 Another prediction of the model is that SO2 policy would
extend the length of region I and contract the length of region II for a spatial monopoly railroad,
increasing market power overall. Controlling for route-speciﬁc effects, we indeed ﬁnd that the annual
average values of L* were 15% larger in 1999 than in 1988 (a difference that is signiﬁcantly different
from zero at the 1% level).
We estimate that roughly 90% of the power plants in the data set are region II plants that are subject
to freight rates equal to ps�w. For these plants, an exogenous shock in unit transportation cost in the
railroad sector (t) has no affect on freight rates, and marginal changes in transportation cost alter
freight rates only to electric utilities less than 550miles distant from the sourcemine (the shortest 10%
of all sample routes). This estimated relationship between marginal transportation cost and freight
rates is inconsistent with the operation of a competitive railroad sector, in which a one-unit decrease
in marginal cost leads to a one-unit decrease in the freight rate throughout the service region,
irrespective of distance from the mine.
The estimated distinction between service regions I and II for a railroad monopoly in Gerking and
Hamilton (2008) provides essential insight into the market features that supported the observed fuel
substitution from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal. In the railroad sector, Ellerman and Montero (1998)
and Ellerman et al. (2000) estimate that real per ton/mile freight rates from the PRB to theMidwest fell
by 44% over the period 1987–1993, and argue that these rate reductions occurred due to increased
competition following deregulation in the Staggers Rail Act in 1980 and to signiﬁcant productivity-
enhancing improvements attained by railroads throughout the period. Controlling for distance, we
ﬁnd real rail rates on PRB coal shipments decreased by 22% over the period 1988–1999, with the
remaining decline in freight rates explained by an expansion of the service territory on the extensive
margin of railroad service to distant utilities that receive lower freight prices per tonmile (Gerking and
Hamilton, 2008). Despite the Staggers Rail Act, railroad behavior over the 1988–1999 period appears
to have become less competitive, as evidenced by the increase in the Lerner indices across routes of
ﬁxed length. Empirical evidence indicates that the real marginal cost of transporting coal declined by
36% over the 1988–1999 period in response to efﬁciency gains that followed the shift from steel
railcars to lighter weight aluminum railcars in the late 1980s and 1990s. The decline in freight rates as
transportation costs decreased in the rail sector.
Another causal factor that contributed to the shift among electric utilities to burning low-sulfur
coal was a dramatic reduction in extraction costs for PRB coal. Over the period 1985–2000, coal
extraction costs declined by 57% from $12.84/ton to $5.55/ton and the average real mine mouth price
of PRB correspondingly coal fell by 64% (from $13.97/ton vs. $5.38/ton) (U.S. Department of Energy,
11 A transportation route is deﬁned as a railhead at or near a particular mine to a particular power plant.
12 The estimated value of the Lerner index over the entire sample (all dates and routes) in Gerking andHamilton (2008) is 0.37,
which accords well with the estimated value of 0.41 over the period 2001–2006 in a recent study commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (Christiansen Associates, Inc., 2008). Concern over railroad market power has led to Companion
Bills (S 146 and HR 233) presently before the U.S. Congress to amend the railroad antitrust exemptions in the Clayton Act.
Energy Information Administration, various years). The dramatic decrease in the mine mouth price of
PRB coal, combined with lower freight rates in the rail sector that occurred through independent
efﬁciency improvements attained by railroads at about this same time, appear to have been the
predominant factors that facilitated the landmark shift in the utilization of PRB coal at electric utilities
in the period surrounding implementation of the U.S. Clean Air Act.
5. Conclusion
Several pertinent conclusions may be drawn from our analysis of the effect of SO2 policy on input
substitution from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal. First, SO2 regulation leads to an increase in the
average transportation cost of delivered PRB coal. By increasing the (allowance-inclusive) price of
high-sulfur coal, SO2 regulation expands the service territory for PRB coal and increases the average
distance each ton of coal is shipped. In the case of a monopoly railroad and perfectly substitutable
fuels, the rise in average delivery cost for PRB coal is coupled with no change in total deliveries of PRB
coal, so that SO2 policy serves only to redistribute low-sulfur coal shipments from nearby utilities to
those further away, reducing social returns. Second, SO2 regulation exacerbates railroadmarket power
by increasing the wedge between the delivered low-sulfur coal price and marginal shipment cost to
(incumbent) utilities in region II. The reason is that freight rates rise by the same magnitude as the
increase in the price of high-sulfur coal, whereas the cost schedule does not change.
Our observations on the limited ability of SO2 regulation to stimulate increased PRB coal shipments
through input substitution are most stark in the case of: (i) a uniform spatial distribution of utilities;
(ii) perfect substitutability between low- and high-sulfur coal in electricity generation; and (iii)
monopoly power by railroads hauling low-sulfur coal. While this situation provides a useful
benchmark to consider the effect of environmental policy in spatially intermediated markets, more
general models that relax these assumptions show that SO2 policy can either raise or lower the
aggregate quantity of PRB coal shipped. Under a non-uniform spatial distribution of utilities, SO2
policy can potentially lead to negative input substitution – that is, a decrease in PRB coal deliveries –
when the density of region II utilities decreases monotonically along the rail line towards the
extensive margin of railroad service, as the contraction effect in this case would exceed the expansion
effect of the policy.
Overall, in the case of U.S. SO2 policy, the evidence suggests that sharp declines in mining cost and
railroad transportation cost for PRB coal at around the time of the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments are
likely to have played a much larger role in facilitating the substitution from high-sulfur coal to low-
sulfur, PRB coal than the environmental regulation. Indeed, it is possible that environmental policy did
not contribute to the observed input substitution at all.
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